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REFORM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
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CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 38/OCTOBER 2003 
KAREL LANNOO 
AND 
ARMAN KHACHATURYAN
* 
1.  Introduction 
On 21 May 2003, the European Commission presented its long-awaited Communication on 
enhancing corporate governance and a second Communication on reinforcing statutory audit 
in the EU (European Commission, 2003a and 2003b). These Communications follow in the 
wake of the EC-sponsored studies on corporate governance in Europe, the recent problems 
with “America Inc.”, the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States in July 2002 
publication of the High Level Group Report II. Together, they recommend a long series of 
legislative proposals and reforms (20 in total), and almost as many proposals for 
recommendations and further studies in these areas.  
The Communications’ far-reaching proposals came somewhat as a surprise. The corporate 
governance debate has been going on for over 10 years in Europe and flourished at national 
level. The Commission repeatedly emphasised that there was no need to intervene at the EU 
level as the codes that were set at national level were fairly similar in their scope and 
recommendations. It was argued that corporate governance was an excellent area in which to 
apply the “soft law” approach and that harmonisation in this area would jeopardise the 
strength of the diversity of the national systems. Moreover, the arguments advanced in 
support of EU intervention were not convincing. 
High-profile corporate scandals in the US have changed this perception fundamentally. In a 
very short period of time, harmonisation of corporate governance standards came to be seen 
as “essential” for Europe in order to rebuild the confidence of investors and to foster business 
competitiveness and efficiency (European Commission, 2003a, p. 3). Further harmonisation 
of audit standards and oversight of the profession is also all of a sudden a high priority. 
Such a dramatic change cannot disguise the fact that the Commission’s new stance is above 
all reactive. It missed an opportunity to set a European code in the mid-1990s that could have 
explicitly acknowledged the greater respect accorded the fundamentals of corporate 
governance in the EU as compared to the US. Moreover, the Commission is probably now 
over-reacting and initiating legislation without any real need to do so. 
This paper analyses the European corporate governance debate and examines both the report 
entitled A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe prepared by the High 
Level Group of Company Law Experts (2002a) (hereinafter referred as HLG Report II) and 
the European Commission’s Communications on the subject. It is structured as follows. 
Section 2 frames the debate on corporate governance in the context of the broader discussion 
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in corporate finance circles on market vs. bank finance and the subsequent regulatory 
response. The paper builds upon the fact that the European system is largely bank-dominated, 
which is characterised by a structure of concentrated ownership and differentiated voting 
rights. Although such a system might be inefficient from a corporate finance perspective, its 
regulation is less cumbersome and less costly. Section 3 briefly addresses the corporate 
governance discussions in the EU member states. In particular, it points out that a variety of 
initiatives and studies in the area of corporate governance have all reached the same 
conclusion that there is no need for an EU corporate governance code, advocating instead a 
soft-law and best-practices approach. Section 4 discusses the recommendations put forward in 
the HLG Report II in the area of corporate governance. It argues that the High Level Group 
and subsequently the Commission failed to demonstrate that the proposed measures will 
rebuild investor confidence or foster business competitiveness and efficiency. Moreover, the 
proposed recommendations are in line with measures aimed at mitigating agency problems 
with dispersed non-controlling shareholders and managers. These measures are in 
fundamental disequilibrium with control and ownership structures in the EU and would 
therefore at best a negligible impact on EU companies and possibly at the worst, a damaging 
effect. A final section puts forward conclusions. 
2.  The Choice of Finance and Its Regulatory Implications 
Unlike the US, Europe is by and large a bank-based system. Despite the fact that the 
liberalisation of European financial markets in the single market programme and the start of 
monetary union were intended to stimulate direct market financing, the effects have been 
limited so far. Total assets of the banking sector in the EU, measured as a percentage of GDP, 
have risen from 161% in 1990 to 239% in 2001. In contrast, total assets of US commercial 
banks stood at 78% of GDP in 2001, increasing slowly from 59% in 1990.
1 Moreover, the 
total value of US bonds and equity outstanding in the markets, measured as a percentage of 
GDP, is roughly twice as large as in the EU.  
From a corporate finance perspective, such a situation is not very efficient. The banking 
market may be dominated by a few players, who may not be interested in financing certain 
higher-risk segments of the market. They may also charge too high a price for underwriting 
certain risks. A market-based system or an environment that offers the choice of both systems 
mitigates this problem. 
From a regulatory perspective, however, establishing the regulation for a bank-based system 
is simpler and less costly compared to a market-based system. It suffices to set a crude 
minimum capital ratio and to have some risk-weighting of the different asset classes, as set in 
the Basel Capital Accord. It also requires a small group of supervisors to enact this agreement.  
The regulation and supervision of a market-based system, on the other hand, are much more 
complex, multi-layered and costly requiring years, if not decades to put in place and run 
smoothly (see Table 1). The regulation of securities markets requires the active participation 
of market intermediaries such as accounting firms, investment banks, law firms, ratings 
agencies and stock exchanges. They put their reputation at stake when supporting a certain 
security. These intermediaries reap the benefit, or bear the cost, of supporting any security. 
The second tier of intermediaries consists of investment and pension funds, which provide 
market demand for securities, and the financial press. The corporate scandals in the US have 
amply demonstrated the importance of these “reputational intermediaries”, but also the 
fragility of such a structure. 
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Table 1. The layers of securities market regulation 
Issuers  Equity and debt securities 
Reputational intermediaries  1
st tier: Accounting firms, investment banks, ratings agents, law 
firms and stock exchanges 
2
nd tier: Investment funds, pension funds, financial press 
Self-regulatory organisations  Professional federations, standard-setters (accounting and 
audit), takeover panels, stock exchanges, central securities 
depositories (CSDs) 
Government institutions  Securities commissions, accounting oversight boards, courts 
Laws  Securities law, company law, bankruptcy law, criminal law 
Source: Adapted from Lannoo (2001). 
The regulation of a market-based system requires active participation of self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs). They control the intermediaries and can be subdivided into voluntary 
(professional organisations) and mandatory (SROs mandated and controlled by the 
government) organisations. By law, intermediaries are liable for faulty information or 
fraudulent practices. 
The regulation of a market-based system requires a well-developed legal mechanism for 
efficient dispute resolution to back up its operations. In general, market-based systems are 
characterised by small dispersed shareholdings, very few of which has an incentive or the 
resources to monitor executive performance. Managers are given a high magnitude of 
discretionary power in which they can pursue corporate strategy and objectives (although 
within the scope of the business judgment rule and general presumptions of fairness). 
Shareholder passivity and discretionary managerial power result in traditional “principal-
agent” types of conflict. Shareholders can either exit or litigate for any alleged managerial 
misconduct such as a lack of adequate disclosure, insider dealing, interested transactions and 
fraud. In the absence of an efficient dispute resolution system that can mandate coercive 
measures and sanctions for non-compliance, any litigation can lead to long and tedious court 
cases. This system also requires an army of well-trained lawyers and an efficient judiciary.  
Adequate corporate governance is part of a well-functioning market-based system, but it is 
also an element of its complexity. Corporate governance is an amalgam of internal company 
rules, soft law approaches (codes) and statutory legislation. Despite many years of discussion 
and general consensus on the basic principles of good corporate governance, it seems that 
market economies are still far from having the framework for adequate enforcement in place, 
and that violation of the basic principles is very common. This leads to further legislation of 
previously non-legislated areas of corporate governance. The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
EC’s Corporate Governance Communication are good examples of this trend. 
It has sometimes been argued that the US is well aware that a market-based system is more 
expensive to establish, but that this is precisely the reason why the US is trying to export it. 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has actively helped emerging markets to 
put in place the basic structures for the regulation and supervision of securities markets. In 
several of these cases, however, emerging markets realised that it was easier to follow the 
bank-based model first before establishing a market-based model. Since resources were 
limited, and the transition to a well-functioning market economy had to be robust, it was 
easier to start with a bank-intermediated financing model. This was the case in most of the 
Central and East European countries, for example. Some of these countries, such as the Czech _______________________________ LANNOO & KHACHATURYAN   ___________________________________ 
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Republic, Hungary and Poland, did however try to follow the other route, but only for a 
limited period of time, and/or without success.
2 
3.  The Debate in the 1990s 
During the last decade, the corporate governance debate has spread to almost all European 
countries, resulting in the adoption of codes that are broadly parallel in their scope and 
recommendations. In general, they address the role of the board of directors, financial 
reporting, the role of the auditors and the function of the Annual General Meeting. 
Having the most developed stock market in the EU, the UK pioneered the corporate 
governance debate in the EU. The debate resulted in the Cadbury Code, adopted in 1992 as 
the listing rule for the London Stock Exchange. The debate successively spread to the 
Netherlands, France and most other European countries, all of which adopted one or more 
codes. Germany was one of the last countries to follow this trend and only adopted a 
corporate governance code in 2002. 
As stated above, the corporate governance codes adopted at the national level throughout the 
EU are fairly similar in nature. Given this situation, the European Commission consulted on 
several occasions with experts as to whether EU action was required in this area. In 1995, a 
study conducted by Ernst & Young for the Commission concluded that the EU should set 
framework principles for corporate governance of large companies in a directive, which could 
be transposed into the individual national legal systems either by law or within the framework 
of a national “best practice” code. Some harmonisation of voting rights would also be 
desirable to increase the proportionality between the subscribed capital and the voting rights 
held (European Commission, 1995). In February 1997, the Commission started a consultation 
on the simplification of company law. At a conference debating the results held in December 
1997, the Commission proposed the creation of a Company Law Forum, in order to better 
prepare Community initiatives.  
Further to the adoption of the Financial Services Action Plan in May 1999 (FSAP, 1998)
3, the 
Commission launched a study on corporate governance codes in the EU member states, and 
the need for any action at EU level (Weil, Gothshal & Menges, 2002). This study found a high 
degree of convergence between the national corporate governance codes, and therefore did 
not advocate the adopt of a single code at the EU level. Since the various codes emanating 
from the member states appeared to support a convergence of governance practices, we argue 
that the Commission should not expend energy on the development of a code applicable to all 
companies in the EU, but should allow market forces to progress in this direction over time. 
What has been missing in the local debates, however, is the European dimension. Although 
European market integration constitutes one of the sources of pressure on national corporate 
governance systems to adapt, the debate on reforming and improving the corporate control 
                                                  
2 The empirical evidence suggests that mere transposition of laws cannot bring the same efficiency results in 
another institutional setting. Gilson (1996) argues that any reform measure makes sense only in the framework of 
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enforcement, compliance norms and institutions (“legality”) in the process of building capital markets in 
transition economies in 1990-98. They report that formal legal protection variables do not have a statistically 
significant relationship with market capitalisation, unlike legality. The authors conclude that external finance will 
not flow into investments in transition economies, even if they radically improve the shareholder and creditor 
protection rules.  
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system was essentially focused on the domestic markets. The national corporate governance 
committees were mostly, if not uniquely, composed of national representatives, and the 
European dimension of the issue was hardly invoked.  
Seen from an international perspective, corporate governance codes are more broadly 
developed and better implemented in Europe than they are in the US. Splitting the role of 
chairman and chief executive, for example, is standard practice in numerous national codes in 
Europe, and is well implemented, whereas the opposite is the rule in the US.  
Furthermore executive remuneration has never spiralled to the levels it has in the US, and 
stock options are much less developed.  Its rise in the EU is attributed to fixed salaries and 
cash bonuses rather than share-option plans. The median CEO remuneration and particularly 
share and share-related remuneration have been constantly increasing in the US since 1990.   
Table 2 shows the dynamics of CEO pay in multiples of manufacturing working pay in the 
EU. In the period 1992-2000, CEOs in the UK are reported to have earned the highest 
increase in remuneration in the EU in multiples of manufacturing workers’ pay. In 2000, they 
earned 25 times more than a manufacturing worker did.  
In contrast to the EU, the ratio of CEO pay to manufacturing worker pay in the US is dramatic 
in its magnitude. It peaked to 1,046 in 1999 and then dropped to 531 and 411 in 2000 and 
2001, respectively (see Figure 1).  
Moreover, share and share-related remuneration in the US has been constantly rising (see 
Figure 2). Over 1980-2001, the percentage of the fixed component of the pay package of the 
top 100 CEOs in the US dropped from 43% to 17%, whereas the share and share-related 
component has risen from 56% to 8%.   
Table 2. CEO remuneration in Europe in multiples of manufacturing workers’ pay 
(1992-2000) 
 
1992 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000 
(ths) 
Increase 
(times) 
NL 10  9  14 13 17 22  621 2.20 
SW  8  7  11 11 13 13  440 1.63 
BE  12 12 13 14 18 19  655 1.58 
UK 16 17 18 23 24 25  720 1.56 
IT  14 16 16 17 20 22  568 1.57 
DE 10  8  11 10 13 11  422 1.10 
ES  17 16 14 15 17 17  399 1.00 
FR  17 15 15 15 15 15  540 0.88 
Source: Soderstrom et al. (2003).  
 _______________________________ LANNOO & KHACHATURYAN   ___________________________________ 
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Figure 1 
 
Average pay of top US 100 CEOs in multiples of worker pay 
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Sources: Piketty & Saez (2001), Hall (2002) and various issues of Business Week. 
 
Figure 2 
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4.  The Turnaround 
Until very recently, the EU explicitly refrained from taking any initiative in the area of 
corporate governance. This field was seen to be the prerogative of member states. Differences 
in standards were not seen to distort the free movement of goods or services, and the ______________________  REFORM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EU  ___________________________ 
7 
subsidiarity clause came into play. This stance changed markedly, however, as a result of the 
Enron affair and the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US. 
Any Community-wide measure in the EU should be evaluated against the standards of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. The test of subsidiarity requires that the Commission should 
bear the burden of proving that member states are not able to implement the measure as 
efficiently as it could be implemented at EU level, whereas the test of proportionality requires 
that any Community-wide action taken should be proportional to the objective pursued.  
In discussing EU action in the area of corporate governance, a distinction should be made 
between company and securities law measures. In the area of securities market regulation, the 
EU has been fairly successful. Several measures have already been adopted and more are 
awaiting adoption, based on the principles of mutual recognition and the single passport. 
Nevertheless, the level of harmonisation and enforcement of the initial measures left much to 
be desired. This was addressed in the FSAP (cited above) and the Lamfalussy Report (2001), 
which provided the necessary underpinnings for the new regulatory framework called for in 
the FSAP and also gave it much-needed publicity. Moreover, Commission also launched an 
ambitious harmonisation project including the adoption of the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) to provide a uniform basis for financial reporting and information disclosure 
in the EU for listed companies and issuers.  
In the area of company law, progress has been limited. The most important reform measures 
have failed after decades of efforts at harmonisation. Overall, the more they tried to harmonise 
“corporate governance” the less successful they were. One major proposal intended to 
harmonise company structures in the, now abandoned, 5th Company Law Directive. Another 
proposal aimed at easing cross-border mergers of companies (10th company law directive). 
The most publicised harmonisation effort has been the establishment of uniform rules for 
takeovers across the EU. This proposal attempted to create a “level playing field” through 
proportionality between risk-bearing capital and control, and introduced the break-through 
rule. Once again, the efforts to harmonise corporate governance structures and control systems 
have been blocked by the member states, each pursuing its own interests. The only real 
progress was the agreement on the regulation for a European company statute (Societas 
Europea, SE) in October 2001, which can in fact be considered a 16
th company law regime in 
the EU (see Box 1). 
The rejection by the European Parliament of the draft take-over bids directive in June 1999, 
and the collapse of Enron in November 2001 accelerated EU policy action. The Commission 
instituted the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (HLG) to advise it on the reform of 
the takeover bids regulation in the EU. The Oviedo Informal Ecofin Council (April 2002) 
extended the mandate of the HLG to advise it on the reform of corporate governance in view 
of the Enron disaster. 
Box 1. The European Company Statute 
The European Company Statute (ECS), on which a final agreement was reached in October 
2001, will give companies operating in more than one member state the option of being 
established as a single European company (Societas Europaea or SE) under Community law. 
This will enable them to operate throughout the EU under one set of rules and with a unified 
management and reporting system, rather than being subject to all the different national laws 
of each member state in which they have subsidiaries. The EU regulation will allow an SE to 
be created in any one of the following four forms:  _______________________________ LANNOO & KHACHATURYAN   ___________________________________ 
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•  as a holding company promoted by public or private limited companies from at least two 
different member states; 
•  as a joint subsidiary of companies from at least two different member states; 
•  through the merger of two or more existing public or private limited companies located in 
at least two member states; or 
•  by transformation of a national company that has operated in two (or more) member states 
for at least two years, without the need to dissolve the company. 
The SE must have its registered office in the same member state as the head office. It can be 
moved from one member state to another on the basis of a simple procedure. The SE offers 
the possibility of one-tier and two-tier boards, in view of the fact that both are common in the 
EU. The minimum capital of an SE is €120,000, in order to ensure that small- and medium-
sized enterprises have the opportunity to make use of it. Many items are left to national law, 
however, the most important one being taxation. 
An SE can only be created if there is consensus on the degree of worker involvement, which 
is defined in a separate directive. If it proved impossible to negotiate a mutually satisfactory 
arrangement, then a set of standard principles, laid down in the annexe to the directive, will 
apply. However, the SE could also be used as a structure to circumvent heavy worker 
representation rules in some member states, as long as these do not represent more than 50% 
in the holding company SE model or 25% following the merger SE model. 
The SE should not be dismissed as another bureaucratic invention. On the contrary, it may 
lead European business to consider re-incorporating as a European company and could allow 
them to simplify their organisational structure. It will, for example, allow large corporations to 
rethink their organisational structure, and to re-organise themselves along specific lines of 
activity, rather than having to incorporate on a country-by-country basis. Legal structures 
could in this sense coincide with the most effective business configuration. 
From a regulatory competition point of view, it could be considered as a 16
th company law 
model in which the EU which may exert pressure on other company law models to adapt over 
time. It may thus, from this perspective, be seen as a more useful way to bring about 
convergence in company law systems in the EU rather than going for outright harmonisation. 
Source: Lannoo & Levin (2002). 
4.1  The HLG Report II 
The HLG Report II, which was issued on 4 November 2002, recommends measures for the 
improvement of internal mechanisms of corporate governance regimes in the EU. It covers 
issues such as shareholders’ rights and minority protection, duties of the board, the role of 
non-executive directors, managerial remuneration and managerial responsibility for financial 
statements, audit practices and EU coordination mechanisms.  
The report’s recommendations are based on the concept of “shareholder democracy”, which 
stems from its previous report on takeover harmonisation across the EU.
4 Though presumably 
                                                  
4 Grossman & Hart (1988) and Harris & Raviv (1988) provide a rigorous analytical framework of 
(non)optimality conditions of the one-share/one-vote rule in the context of takeovers. Although the proposed 
settings differ in some respects, both studies conclude that the distribution of voting rights affects the value of the 
firm and under qualifying conditions (almost always), the one-share/one-vote rule is not in any event Pareto ______________________  REFORM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EU  ___________________________ 
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both the HLG and the European Commission associate shareholder democracy with the one-
share/one-vote regime, neither of them has ever clearly stated this connection nor endorsed 
the unconditional one-share/one-vote regime for listed companies in the EU.
5  
The proposed recommendations are in line with efficiency measures of the US-type dispersed 
ownership structures, but they are not effective in mitigating the agency problems associated 
with concentrated shareholder structures in the EU. Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate ownership 
concentration in the US and some selected EU member states.
6 The percentage of listed 
companies under majority control on the NYSE is 1.7% as compared to 68% in Austria. The 
percentage of companies with a blocking minority of at least 25% is 93.6% in Belgium as 
compared to 5.2% in the US. 
 
Figure 3. The ownership structure in the EU vs. the US (percentage of listed companies under 
majority control) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
optimal. There will be wealth-increasing deviations from the one-share/one-vote rule. While this concept might 
be politically marketable, its economic foundations are indeed very questionable. 
In the context of takeovers, the HLG promulgates that shareholders are the owners of the company and they 
should take the ultimate decision to sell the company. The HLG Report on Takeovers I (2002b) endorses the 
principle of proportionality (not one-to-one match) between the risk-bearing capital (a concept previously 
unknown to economics although the economic logic associates it with cash flow rights) and decision-making. 
Through endorsing the breakthrough rule, the HLG effectively redefines the concept of ownership, shifting it to 
those with cash-flow rights and giving them the power to decide. Thus, paradoxically, by promoting shareholder 
democracy and decision-making, the HLG indeed at best demotes and at worst oppresses real ownership rights, 
and hence shareholder democracy. See the proposed 13
th directive on takeovers.  
5 See also the Communication on corporate governance where the EC argues that it intends to conduct a study on 
the effects of the principle of proportionality between capital and control. What the EC simply argues for is a 
general test of proportionality rather than the one-share/one-vote match in deciding on the benefits of shareholder 
democracy.  
6 See Barca & Becht (2001).  
68 65.764.2
56.1
39.4
32.6
26.3
2.4 2 1.7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Austria Belgium Germany  Italy  NL
Spain Sweden UK Nasdaq NYSE_______________________________ LANNOO & KHACHATURYAN   ___________________________________ 
10 
Figure 4. The ownership structure in the EU vs. the US (percentage of companies with a 
blocking minority of at least 25%) 
 
 
Table 3 demonstrates differentiated voting rights in the EU. Sweden leads the list with 55% of 
its companies employing differentiated voting rights to separate voting rights from cash flow 
rights. Such a system allows controlling the company without affecting the liquidity thereof.  
Table 3. Differentiated voting rights in Europe 
Country  Number of 
companies 
Proportion of companies with 
differentiated voting rights (%) 
Sweden 334  0.55 
Italy 208  0.41 
Finland 129  0.36 
Denmark 210  0.33 
UK 1953  0.24 
Ireland 69  0.23 
Austria 99  0.23 
Germany 704  0.18 
France 607  0.03 
Spain 632  0.00 
Portugal 87  0.00 
Belgium 130  0.00 
Source: Bennedsen & Nielsen (2002).  
In general, EU corporate structures are characterised by different kinds and magnitudes of 
agency problems. They should be tackled by different policy measures rather than mandating 
a US-type regulatory response which is both a misleading and an ineffective way to enhance 
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the efficiency of the corporate governance system in the EU. Nevertheless, the HLG Report II 
endorses the unconditional merits and supremacy of the US corporate governance model for 
the EU.
7 
4.1.1  Disclosure 
The HLG argues that a proper disclosure regime has a crucial importance in company law 
structures in general and in corporate governance in particular. It recommends disclosing key 
elements of corporate governance and its practices in an annual corporate governance 
statement regardless of whether its provisions are mandatory or voluntary. In so far as this 
makes the corporate decision-making process and practices more transparent, this is a step 
forward. 
It is interesting to observe that the HLG Report II recognises that disclosure is a moving target 
and that the priority of items to be disclosed changes over time. In the context of the annual 
corporate governance statement, the HLG implicitly supports the benefits of regulatory 
competition by stating that the member states should be in charge of setting “a system of 
flexible and efficiently adaptable subordinate rules,” while the European Commission should 
only have a coordinating role.  
4.1.2  Shareholders 
The HLG Report’s recommendation with respect to shareholders can be classified into two 
broad categories: rights of the shareholders and the responsibilities of institutional investors.  
Shareholders’ rights 
The HLG Report II observes that the power of influence over the company should be 
conferred upon its shareholders. It further argues that particularly in the case of listed 
companies, shareholders should act both on their own behalf and on behalf of other 
stakeholders in monitoring corporate performance. The HLG Report II argues that 
shareholders should act as “watchdogs”, and refers to shareholders as exercising influence. 
However, while there might be common objectives, shareholders’ needs and objectives are 
quite different from those of other stakeholders. Any such monitoring on behalf of other 
stakeholders will be undertaken if and only if its benefits to the shareholders exceed the costs 
of monitoring, no matter how much benefit other stakeholders incur.  
The HLG Report II endorses what is called a “rational apathy” when shareholders prefer to 
sell out shares rather than monitor and influence corporate performance. Nevertheless, it is not 
clear why this might prove disadvantageous as the HLG Report II points out. The right to exit 
is a conscious exercise of freedom of choice. Shareholders generally rationalise their 
decisions on the basis of the costs and benefits of being shareholders and by the costs and 
benefits of monitoring. Although it is true that small dispersed shareholders may be reluctant 
to incur the costs of monitoring as its benefits will be shared by all shareholders (the 
traditional free-rider problem), controlling shareholders have both the incentive and the 
resources to do so.  
                                                  
7 The universal efficiency of this system, however, has come under criticism. Roe (1998) for example argues that 
“it is natural to associate American institutions, such as a vibrant stock market and diffuse ownership of large 
firms, as both inevitable and efficient.” Nevertheless Seligman (1986), Gilson (1987) and Jarrel & Poulsen 
(1988) challenge the widespread perception of the superiority of “American institutions” with respect to the 
enactment of state anti-takeover regimes and controversies on the one-share/one-vote regime. _______________________________ LANNOO & KHACHATURYAN   ___________________________________ 
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The HLG Report II also makes specific recommendations with respect to shareholders’ rights 
to ask questions, to table resolutions, to vote in absentia and to participate in general meetings 
by means of electronic communication. Special investigative rights should be conferred upon 
minority shareholders holding a minimum of 5-10% of the share capital to require special 
investigation by a court or an appropriate administrative agency. The HLG argues that an EC 
directive might be required to facilitate cross-border voting. This is a welcome move insofar 
as it would enhance shareholder participation at the EU level.  
The HLG Report II argues for equivalent (but not equal) opportunities and facilities in 
shareholders’ participation, information and communication rights across the EU to allow 
enhanced decision-making.   
Responsibilities of institutional investors 
The HLG Report II observes that institutional investors have a key role in the corporate 
governance of companies in which they invest. They have fiduciary responsibilities vis-à-vis 
their beneficiaries, which creates a situation necessitating regulation. The HLG argues that 
there are double-edged agency problems with institutional investors insofar as they enter into 
fiduciary relationships with their beneficiaries and also have investment relationships with the 
companies they invest in. Nevertheless, the HLG Report makes recommendations only with 
respect to the relationship between institutional investors and their beneficiaries.
8 On grounds 
of possible agency problems between institutional investors and their beneficiaries (such as 
internal reward schemes that may be paid to the detriment of beneficiaries), the HLG Report 
requires institutional investors to disclose to their beneficiaries their investment policies, 
along with when and how they have been exercised.  
Nevertheless, the role of institutional investors should not have been formalised either in the 
HLG Report or in the Commission Communications. Imposing such a requirement does not 
address the agency problems between institutional investors and their beneficiaries. It is just 
because investors want to minimise the time and resources devoted to monitoring that they 
entrust their shares to institutional investors. The latter carry out efficient monitoring and 
control (punishment) of executive management by exercising their voting rights or by 
threatening to exercise them. Instead of mandating costly and burdensome disclosure 
procedures for institutional investors, the European Commission should think of ways to 
strengthen their fiduciary responsibilities and the enforcement system in an effort to deal with 
agency problems between institutional investors and their beneficiaries at their source and to 
mitigate their magnitude.  
Another mechanism that can correct the misalignment of interests between institutional 
investors and their clients is contractual regulation. The rights and responsibilities of 
institutional investors and their beneficiaries can be regulated by contracts at least as 
efficiently as by imposing a mandatory regime. In particular, the internal reward schemes of 
many institutional investors are tied to the performance of the portfolios they hold, which acts 
both as a motivating and a disciplining mechanism. 
 
                                                  
8 The Commission argues in the Communication on corporate governance that it will take the necessary steps in 
the medium term to amend the existing EU regulations on institutional investors to foster the role of institutional 
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4.1.3  Board of Directors  
The structure and functions of the board 
The HLG Report II argues that a strong and balanced board is a key for good corporate 
governance. The board should closely monitor managerial strategies and performance in an 
effort to bridge the gap between uninformed shareholders and fully informed managers. 
Nevertheless, shareholders are not necessarily uninformed unless they do not bother to be 
informed, nor are managers ever fully informed.  
The HLG Report recognises that one-tier and two-tier board systems reflect legal and 
institutional legacies, and that neither of them precludes good corporate governance regimes. 
The HLG finds it inadvisable to mandate a particular board system for the EU and offers 
companies a choice between the two systems. This move indeed facilitates a wider “issuer 
choice” regime in the EU.  
The HLG Report confirms that controlling shareholder structures mitigate the problems of 
executive monitoring in the EU. At the same time, however, they create another set of agency 
problems between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders on the one hand and the 
minority owners and managers on the other. Consequently, controlling shareholder structures 
necessitate monitoring by non-executive directors in the areas of executive nomination, 
executive remuneration and auditing. Non-executive directors should therefore be 
independent in the majority.  
According to the HLG Report, executive nomination should be entrusted to the nomination 
committee. The remuneration committee should make sure that executive remuneration policy 
and individual remuneration are approved by shareholders, properly accounted for, and 
disclosed in annual accounts. The audit committee should be responsible for monitoring the 
internal accounting policies and practices as well as the risk management system. It should 
also conduct external audit selection, control audit performance and ensure auditor 
independence.  
In line with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the HLG proposes collective executive responsibility 
based on the standard of the wrongful trading rule which might involve sanctions and 
executive disqualification across the EU.  
The structure of the board and its efficiency implications  
Paradoxically, the HLG both recognises the problems of controlling structures and mandates a 
typical solution for non-controlling dispersed structures. The nature and magnitude of agency 
problems of controlling shareholder structures in the EU differ significantly from that of 
dispersed shareholder structures in the US. If indeed there is a lesson to be learned from the 
US experience, it is that these agency problems can be addressed through the US type of 
judicial doctrine and judicial review rather than imposing a costly yet inappropriate non-
executive structure for the listed companies in the EU – not to mention the further need for 
standards of independence and competence.  
It would have been a more viable and efficient step forward if the Commission had introduced 
measures that could effectively constrain the private benefits of control by controlling 
shareholders. By promoting their own interest through general oversight, majority 
shareholders also promote that of the minority. Nevertheless, controlling shareholders can _______________________________ LANNOO & KHACHATURYAN   ___________________________________ 
14 
unilaterally and disproportionally benefit from their holdings in three ways: through 
operating, selling control and freeze-outs. 
9 
There are two aspects of operations: i) business and strategic decisions and ii) direct dealing 
with the corporation. As for business and strategic decisions, the standard of enforcement in 
the US is the business judgment rule.
10 In the US the intrinsic fairness standard
11 applies to 
any transaction between the controlling shareholder and the corporation. If the standards of 
the business judgment rule and intrinsic fairness rule are met, then there is no need to regulate 
such activity.  
As for the second source of private benefits associated with the sale of control, the US again 
subjects it to general judicial review if a dispute arises. In general, if i) the controlling 
shareholder acquires minority shares in anticipation of sale with proper disclosure and ii) the 
acquirer purchases a controlling shareholding not to extract disproportionate benefits of 
control, there is no need to regulate the flow of the value from one controlling shareholder to 
another. 
For freeze-out transactions, the rules are more complex. The basic legal rule governing these 
transactions, however, is the rule of fairness which is further bifurcated into the rules of fair 
dealing and fair price.  
Hence, this would suggest that judicial doctrines can effectively restrict the amount of control 
benefits accrued by controlling shareholders. It is also clear that any such doctrine and judicial 
review does not eliminate the private benefits of control. They just provide benchmarks for 
standards. Therefore, the introduction of Delaware-type judicial doctrines for controlling 
transactions and subjecting them to a simple judicial review, rather than trying to regulate 
them extensively, can be seen as a step forward.  
4.2  The Commission’s Communications on Corporate Governance and the Statutory 
Audit 
4.2.1  The Commission’s Communication on corporate governance 
The Communication on corporate governance fully and unconditionally endorses the HLG 
Report. It announces 17 legislative and 7 non-legislative measures in the area of corporate 
governance. The Communication proposes the harmonisation of the collective responsibility 
of board members at the European level, the annual disclosure of key elements in corporate 
governance structures and practices by all EU-listed companies, and the creation of a 
European Corporate Governance Forum to coordinate the corporate governance efforts of the 
member states. 
The harmonisation of the liability of board members is clearly given in the introduction of the 
personal liability of the CFO and CEO for the financial statements of the company, as 
introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Nevertheless, the SEC maintains that collective 
                                                  
9 See Gilson & Gordon (2003).  
10 The business judgment rule is a rule granting directors immunity from liability if their actions have been 
executed in good faith, using sound business judgment and exercised with reasonable care. Section 4.01(a) of the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance reads: “A director or officer has a duty to the 
corporation to perform the director’s or officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would 
reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances…” 
11 The intrinsic fairness standard obliges the controlling shareholder to prove that any transaction between her 
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responsibility, as proposed by the EC, is not equivalent to personal liability; hence the 
problem for EU companies listed in the US remains. 
The centrepiece of the Communication is the requirement that all EU-listed companies must 
produce an annual statement on corporate governance. Listed companies will be required to 
include in their annual reports and accounts a coherent statement covering the key elements of 
their corporate governance structures and practices. At a minimum, this statement should 
include the following information: 
a)  the operation of the shareholder meeting and its key powers, the description of 
shareholder rights and how they can be exercised; 
b)  the composition and operation of the board and its committees; 
c)  the shareholders holding major holdings, their voting and control rights as well as key 
agreements; 
d)  the other direct and indirect relationships between these major shareholders and the 
company, and any material transactions with other related parties; and 
e)  the existence and nature of a risk-management system. 
Reference should be made to a local corporate governance code, with which the company 
complies or in relation to which it explains deviations. 
The Commission reiterates that there is no need for a European corporate governance code 
either on grounds of subsidiarity or proportionality. But it adds at the same time that “a self-
regulatory market approach, based solely on non-binding recommendations, is clearly not 
always sufficient to guarantee the adoption of sound corporate governance practices. (…) 
Therefore, a common approach should be adopted at EU level with respect to a few essential 
rules and adequate coordination of corporate governance codes should be ensured.”  
The end result is a super code for European corporate governance! The Commission firstly 
harmonises the key elements of the national codes, and secondly mandates compliance with 
these codes through a legal instrument: a directive. In a very subtle way, the Commission 
thereby proposes a more far-reaching harmonisation than it has adhered to in the past and 
even than is currently in place in the member states. It disregards the self-regulatory approach 
that was followed in all member states and proposes to override the diversity found in national 
legal systems via an extensive series of harmonising legislation. This legislation encompasses, 
among others items: 
a)  the structure of corporations;  
b)  corporate governance disclosure requirements; 
c)  an integrated legal framework to facilitate efficient shareholder communication and 
decision-making; 
d)  increased disclosure of group structure relations; and 
e)  enhanced disclosure of institutional investors and their investment and voting policies. 
To coordinate these efforts, the Commission proposes to create a European Corporate 
Governance Forum. Member states should designate a code with which listed companies 
should comply – since some member states have more than one – and ensure compliance and 
disclosure. The Forum should aim at coordinating these efforts and will be chaired by the 
Commission. 
The proposals of the Commission also contain some specific problems. The requirement, for 
example, that listed companies comply with a local code, raises the question of the location of 
the business. Is it the location of the principal place of business, or is it the location where the _______________________________ LANNOO & KHACHATURYAN   ___________________________________ 
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securities are admitted? In this sense, the Commission’s proposal perpetuates the different 
national codes. It would in this sense be better to explicitly recognise the freedom to choose 
between codes.  
4.2.2  The Commission’s Communication on reinforcing the statutory audit 
The measures as proposed in the statutory audit Communication are probably more useful and 
more consistent with previous positions of the Commission on the subject, although here also 
the impact of events across the Atlantic can clearly be noticed. Approximately 2 million 
statutory audits are conducted annually in the EU subject to member state regulations. 
Measures proposed by the statutory audit Communication are intended to harmonise both the 
regulatory framework for statutory audits as well as to enhance their independence and 
quality. Eventually, these proposals are targeted at defining how audits should be conducted, 
by which means, and how audit independence and quality should be safeguarded. In an effort 
to enhance the accuracy and reliability of audited accounts and strengthen public oversight of 
auditors at member state and EU level, the Commission proposes to modernise the 8th 
Company Law Directive with a principles-based Directive.  
The Communication proposes to create an EU Audit Regulatory Committee (AAC) to decide 
on implementing measures for the new directive, to be chaired by the Commission. The 
Communication leaves in the middle whether this Committee should also have a coordinating 
role of national oversight systems, which would be required to respond to the creation of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
US, and to show that equivalent measures are in place in the EU. However, the Commission 
stresses that an EU coordination mechanism is needed. Such a body could “assess the need for 
registration and oversight requirements of non-EU audit firms that perform audit work for 
companies whose securities are traded on EU regulated markets”.
12 
We would argue that the harmonisation of national systems of oversight should be considered 
urgently. The actual organisation of public oversight (or the lack thereof) does not inspire 
much confidence in the auditing profession, and a European coordination mechanism is 
required to ensure enforcement of rules and to respond to the creation of the PCAOB. 
Establishment of the European oversight body over the audit profession, however, cannot be 
foreseen in the short term given the time, procedures and efforts involved in the EU decision-
making process. Therefore, the prospects of any reasonable compromise in the near future 
between the US and the EU remain dim.  
5.  Conclusions 
Unlike securities market regulation, it is much harder to make a compelling argument for the 
harmonisation of company law in the EU. Moreover, since the adoption of the European 
Company Statute in October 2001, a “16th” company law model now exists that will facilitate 
cross-border operations for companies and stimulate national systems to adapt. 
Many of these initiatives stem from the overall view that a bank-based financing system is not 
efficient and that Europe needs to adapt its regulations to stimulate market financing. 
Considering the more than decade-long debate on corporate governance and the gross 
distortions in the US system, however, one may wonder whether market financing is so 
efficient after all. A proper cost/benefit analysis may be the most useful way to answer this 
question. 
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The Commission’s proposal to set minimum corporate governance requirements for the 
member states and to mandate compliance with national corporate governance codes 
represents a far-reaching harmonisation of company law, which is difficult to justify. It will 
give rise to a lengthy political process, whose outcome is difficult to predict at this stage. 
Many of the proposals are simply reacting to events and new legislation in the US, rather than 
taking a pro-active stance. 
We would argue that the European Commission missed an opportunity in the mid-1990s to 
promote a European code, which was taken up by other institutions, i.e. the OECD. It failed to 
promote the strength of the diversity of Europe’s corporate governance systems in response to 
the failures in US corporate governance. And it is now trying to introduce a far-reaching 
degree of harmonisation, largely in response to problems that originated in the US and to the 
legislative measures that were subsequently taken in the US. 
In 1995, a CEPS working party argued that the European Commission should promote the 
adoption by European industry of a self-regulatory code of good practice in corporate 
governance. This code would set minimum standards for the direction and control of 
corporations in the EU. It was intended to stimulate the European dimension of corporate 
governance in the member states, and in the process, it might have pointed to lacunae in 
national codes and served as a benchmark for the Central and Eastern European countries in 
the approximation of their laws. In this sense, it would have contributed to convergence in the 
European corporate governance systems. 
Having disregarded the corporate governance issue in the past, the Commission has also failed 
to respond to events in the US in a pro-active way. It could have emphasised that the basic 
principles of corporate governance are much better respected in the EU than they are in the 
US. In this sense, the strength of the diversity could have been highlighted. We argue that 
given national diversities, the Commission should promote regulatory competition in 
corporate governance standards. Regulatory competition among national regulators and 
exchanges is better positioned not only to respond to the real needs of companies and 
investors but it is also endowed with a more powerful self-correcting mechanism with which 
to recover from any misguided or inefficient measures. It can also serve as a disciplining 
mechanism for regulators and exchanges by tying their very existence to their responsiveness 
to the needs of the real market.  
By taking a reactive approach to the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, however, the Commission 
seems to be signalling its preference to strengthen its own powers, as the US SEC has done, 
rather than to build on the strength of the diversity found in the member states. The 
Commission is essentially trying to accommodate to the changes in US law. 
The Commission’s proposals also fail to reflect the institutional realities of corporate 
governance and ownership in the EU. Mandating the US type of corporate regulation is at best 
unwarranted and at worst a misleading effort to increase the efficiency of the EU-wide 
corporate governance system. Highly concentrated ownership and control systems create 
agency problems between controlling and non-controlling shareholders that can be addressed 
more efficiency through the US type of judicial doctrines and extensive judicial review.  
Despite the fact that the Commission’s proposals on audit are more useful than those it has put 
forward on corporate governance, even they are still incomplete. It will require considerable 
time until the EU can put a sound system of audit oversight in place. This will further delay a 
possible US-EU regulatory compromise on the oversight of the audit profession.  
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